Cognitive approach to certain behaviors of entrepreneurs
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1 ANTECEDENTS OF THE WORK, OBJECTIVES

Because of the economic role businesses play, the subject plays a significant role in the world of economic theory, business science, management and psychology (some examples: Ferreira, Fernandes and Kraus 2017; Randolp-Seng, Mitchell and Mitchell 2014:1; etc.).

In their summarizing article, Wennekers and Thurik (1999) highlight the fact that there is an obvious and close relationship between the individual entrepreneurial layers and the social levels of the economy (as confirmed by others, e.g. Naudé 2013, etc.).

Apart from their function as the driving force of the economy, SMBs (small and medium sized businesses) have a significant role in creating (economic, geographical, cultural, scientific, social) innovation in a particular region, and therefore in its development, too (Acs, Autio and Szerb 2014; Chatterji, Glaeser and Kerr 2014).

Based on the Socially Situated Cognition Approach, we suppose (Smith and Semin 2004; 2007) that people perceive and attribute significance to that perception, and respond to the stimuli of a certain environment (situated, distributed) by selecting a response from the response pool.

1.1 AIMS SET, HYPOTHESES TO ADDRESS AND QUESTIONS

I follow the division as it is one of the fundamental foundations of organizational psychology, where the relationship between enterprises and the economy really means that the we can see a connection above the individual, organizational and macro layers.

Another direction of the research is survival and sustainability. Shaver and Scott (1991) titled their article Person, Process, Choice. In the model behind the title, they write that there needs to be a person who continues along the decision-making, assessment process, at the end of which this person makes a choice which results in behavioral changes and has consequences. I consider this process as the guideline in this paper.

I formulated four hypotheses in the paper:

H1: Regarding the basic pillars of the entrepreneurial ecosystem I supposed that though the hard elements like infrastructure, legal and commercial regulatory conditions, government support, capital and money market conditions are important, the quality of the ecosystem is much more defined by the so-called soft elements. Behind these soft factors is the formal and non-formal education resulting in management capacity, socio-social values and therefore the culture that provides significant social support (safety net), courage, calm conditions in experimenting and starting over in case of failure.

H2: Rethinking the approach to the entrepreneurial process was my second challenge. Based on professional literature and my own observations, I intended to better separate the brainstorming phase than the currently accepted approaches to entrepreneurial process do. I think that the entrepreneurial process itself is fundamentally a short period within the lifecycle of a company, preceded by brainstorming, followed by a period of growth, then in turn followed by a consolidated organizational cycle.

H3: Thirdly, I formulated that only a very few fulfil the accepted definition of an entrepreneur based on professional literature and my own observations. All this leads to the examination of the roles of an entrepreneur, the competencies attributable to them, and their typical personality traits. Here I defined a secondary aim, as well, which may create a new entrepreneurial category,
displaying the prototype of the expectations of classic entrepreneurial definitions. This was termed NCO, i.e. Non-Conventional Organizations.

H4: At last, but not least, I formulated an organizational competence profile description based on my own experiences, my earlier research and professional literature that defines the minimum survival criteria of organizations (which I termed KO criteria). In the past 60 years, we have learnt a lot about the excellent operational opportunities of organizations, however, those phenomena that make a company excellent not necessarily aid it in its survival. The first level is that the organization stays alive in the ever-stronger competition. I sought to determine what these minimum criteria might be.

1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The dissertation gives an overview of the organizational paradigm in which businesses appear and operate, divided into larger chapters. In this chapter, the mainstream is a systems theory-based, process-oriented and evolutive approach. The overview of the definitions of entrepreneurs and schools provides a framework for this. In the next larger chapter, the literature about the entrepreneurs themselves is in the foreground. My stream of thoughts progressed along the roles of the entrepreneur. The roles of entrepreneur, manager (Minniti and Bygrave 2001), investor (Alvarez and Barney 2005), expert (Gerber 2007), inventor and producer have been reviewed, and the ones created from the mixture of these (Gartner, Starr and Bhat, 1999; Cuervo, Ribeiro and Roig 2007; Mathias and Williams 2017). I separated the entrepreneurs from the other actors or from the representatives of other characters based on several points of view e.g. from the small business owners (Carland, Hoy, Boulton and Carland 1984; Rauch and Frese 2000; Acs 2006; Block, Kohn, Miller and Ulric 2015), or from managers (Kalkan and Kaygusuz 2012).

Differentiating dimensions: inclination to take risks (Stewart and Roth 2001); values (Conger, York and Wry 2012); their personality (Brandstätter 2011; Németh and Kis-Tamás 2015); motivation (Shane, Locke and Collins 2012) skills (Mitchelmore and Rowley 2010; Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 2006, stb.) thought patterns (Sanchez 2012; Baron 2000); cognitive distortions and heuristics (Busenitz and Barney 1997; Simon, Houghton and Aquino 2000).

The distinction of the roles was made necessary by the fact that, as I showed, their tasks differ in different roles, for which different competencies are required and they make different decisions due to the expectations of the particular role and motivational background. Following this, I explored decision-making, more closely the entrepreneurial decision-making. I placed emphasis on the environmental effects of the entrepreneur, both in a physical, cultural and socio-social sense. Through Moore’s (1986) I pointed out the steps through which the entrepreneurial process manifests itself, and the external factors surrounding it, which need to be considered. What I found most important was the fact that the phases of the idea, the realization and later the growth separated (figure 11 of the Annex).

In chapter four, I dealt with the enterprises themselves as entities. I placed great emphasis on understanding the value creation of entrepreneurs, i.e. transformation (as an organizational process) (e.g. Flamholtz 2009), and the related definitions of alternative (e.g. Thaler 2016; Mullainathan and Shafrir 2014) and transactional cost (Williamson 2005). Based on a whole library of professional literature, with my colleagues we created a model, with novelty content contribution (COVΛ organizational model), which we described here (Németh et al under publishing). I emphasized the organizational life cycles, because of my process-focused approach. Based on these organizational approaches and models, I put greater emphasis on the entrepreneurial process itself (modus operandi) and the organizational culture (modus vivendi). Having studied the life cycle models of companies, to which, among others, the summarizing article of Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) contributed, so that the need for a new, updated approach in the field of entrepreneurial process could emerge.
In the fifth and the last chapter processing professional literature, I explored the environment and ecosystem of enterprises. I examined what elements are required for the creation and operation of a successful ecosystem. Among others, Isenberg (2012) came up with dozens of dimensions. In their latest GEM report, Acs, Szerb, Autio and Lloyd (2017) also describe a framework system made up of 12 components. In this, as opposed to the above, such dynamic components appear, as the education system, market structure, trial-and-error learning dynamics of entrepreneurs etc. ... At this point, I introduced the concept of Non-Conventional Organizations (NCO) with the purpose of taking the definitions of the literature closer to the categorizing (prototyping) of innovative enterprises appearing in reality (Csigás and Németh 2015; Németh 2009; 2017). A sub-chapter is inserted in this chapter, analyzing the data from Hungary, based mainly on the GEM research of professor Szerb, and also the work of others, e.g. Horváth and Szerb 2016; Szerb and Bugár 2015; Magos and Németh 2014; Szerb and Lukovszki 2013, Noszkay 2017).

I introduce my research in chapter six. Here I describe both the methodology and the characteristics of the database. As research methodology, I selected Grounded Theory (Corbin and Strauss 2015). The only thing to be known beforehand (on a hypothetical level) was that the entrepreneurial process is problematic, due to the fact that the management of complexity required of entrepreneurs is not possible in the form in which it is expected of them by their environment. I base my research method on this hypothesis, possibly resulting in data that could make this problem more tangible. I invented the ‘post mortem’ analytical methodology i.e. reverse analysis of defunct companies to discover their cause of death. This pointed at what deficiencies entrepreneurs/decision-makers possessed that proved “fatal” for the enterprise (dynamic capacity: Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997).

In the chapter “Deductions” I introduced a new entrepreneurial model. This is a novel approach to the entrepreneurial process. The model unequivocally declares that the brainstorming phase, the entrepreneurial phase, the build-up of the organization and the growth phase, and also the consolidated operations phase can be well distinguished from one another. I also elaborated on what could be the main tasks to be solved by the organization in different stages, for which an actor with certain competencies and profile would be needed. This leads to one of the novel statements, which claims that it is not possible for one person to complete the entrepreneurial process. Therefore, the actor as entrepreneur by the classic definition makes no sense in itself as it is only an episode actor in the process.

2 MATERIAL AND METHOD

2.1 DATABASES, PROCEDURES AND AIMS

Due to the characteristics of the databases, I was able to choose only from a narrow selection of statistical procedures. As only defunct companies were included in the databases, the “death of the company” could not be a dependent variable. The number of respondents (companies) was sufficient, but marked with focus only on one-two items (i.e. they gave relatively few causes of death - this may strengthen the validity of the database). There was a low number of ‘sign’ data compared to the number of items. It was practical and possible to run Anti Image Correlation even in this case. It was practical because it examined how close the connection between certain variables were with other variables, and therefore shows exactly what I was seeking (Huzsvai and Vincze 2012; Sajtos and Mitev 2007).

I examined the stability of my methodology by comparing the different categorizations, too (cross validation). Here a simple paired t test helped me. This was because the sample is shared, meaning that what happened was not the comparison of the data of the two groups (as in case of other t tests) but the comparison of different data within the same group (Huzsvai and Vincze 2012; Sajtos and Mitev 2007).
2.2 DATABASES

My hypotheses covered more than one subject, therefore I acquired evidential data from various databases to prove them.

1. I used the databases of the last three years (2014, 2015, 2016) of the GEM research for the ecosystem subject (Hypothesis 1). I reviewed the data relating to the ecosystem marked by the NES (National Expert Survey) panel created in the GEM research, but I will quote from the sole trader-centered replies of the representative population (N=2000), as well. The expert panel (NES) is assembled by the international team of GEM, addressing politicians, entrepreneurs, experts, researchers and researchers of a certain nation, at least 36 persons. The examination is a semi-structured interview and a Likert scale (1-9) questionnaire of 100 questions.

2. With regard to the other hypothesis, data from a so-called ‘post mortem’ database was compiled. The publication on the original collection was prepared in the work of Németh and Magos (2015), which I have since elaborated on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data unit (n)</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Data content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>CB Insight</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>Average/weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Autopsy.io</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Average/weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Competency research of early phase entrepreneurs (Szathmári et al. manuscript)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1 CB Insight

The CB Insight database contains (n=)204 voluntary reports, but seven elements had to be excluded because there was not enough information for their categorization. In the end I worked with (n=)197 elements. Founders made statements on the reasons of failure in the form of blog, tweet, news announcement or website post.

2.2.2 Autopsy.io

Autopsy.io contains 146 voluntary submissions. Founders (141 people) or an insider close to them (5 people) made a statement on the cause of failure in the form of a blog. The purpose of the blog statements is to discover the causes of failure n=146 (April 20, 2017).

2.3 LIMITATIONS OF DATABASE ANALYSIS

The database records were created by way of self-reporting (error 1). This may contain mistakes, distortions, in itself.

The other area where I may have made mistakes is by not categorizing the data of the database properly (error 2).

The third possibility of error arises from an inadequate system of categorization in which we attempt to differentiate the data (error 3). We use two categorization systems (mode 1 and mode 2, see description later).

The fourth possible area for error is that our database only contains failed companies (error 4) i.e. there is no normative group to contrast it with during the study. One statement must be true - i.e. a phenomenon must imply failure with higher likelihood \( P(S|\neg c) \), than when it is not present.

As the fifth, I highlight that my database units are discrete phenomena, however, the stereotypical observer in us may see correlations and would connect the phenomena using logical correlations that seem sensible to him (Kelley 1967). Correlation may not necessarily imply causation (error 5).

The sixth error may result from corrupted data (error 6a). It only contains data that belong to companies that volunteered. Therefore, cases which the leader/owner did not wish to publish will not be available to us. The sample is distorted from another aspect, too (error 6b), the companies are largely North American and with activities mainly linked to the Internet. This also means that the sample is not representative.
At the end of the list I include the well-known typical errors of statistics that have become classic. Number seven on my list is therefore the possibility of type I and type II errors. This means that although my initial null hypothesis was correct, I reject it based on the figures received (type I - false positive). Type II error possibility (false negative) is when I accept the hypothesis although it is not correct. I trust that I will not make type three or four errors, either, where I reject an already incorrect question, or incorrectly explain an incorrect hypothesis rejected correctly.

I prepared an aggregated list from the CBInsight TOP20 list, as causes and consequences apparently were mixed up. I focused on the causes, as there can be various consequences, for example one of the most definitive that leads to failure (table 8 in the appendix).

The second list of “errors” was generated on the basis of professional literature and the hypotheses (mode 2). I termed this ‘research errors list’ (table 9 in the appendix).

2.4 Methodology

Empirical study of entrepreneurial behavior, difficult (Storey 1991). We stand no chance to filter out ‘hidden parameters’ (Mérő 1996:224 referring to von Neumann) and ‘blind chance’. Bird (2014:116) points out three problems that surface in such cases:
1. there is no agreement as to which of the observed behaviors are important, entrepreneurial behavior is not fundamentally defined and categorized;
2. we do not understand the palette of entrepreneurial behavior and we are unable to use it;
3. we forget that entrepreneurial behavior must be placed in context.

Christensen and Raynor (2003) suggest that it is worth studying failures and unsuccessful phenomena that likely occur afterward, as well, with consideration of the above criteria.

2.4.1 Post mortem methodology

My inspiration for the research methodology came, on the one hand, from medical activity, and, on the other hand, from the methodology of reverse engineering (Samuelson and Scotchmer 2002). Earlier we could see in the professional literature of management science how to build an excellent organization and what kind of typical errors can be made. However, these only barely revealed which are those that can actually matter for the survival of the organization.

3 Results

3.1 Assessment of the database results

3.1.1 Assessment of the Ecosystem and individual level research data of the GEM research

GEM researcher created a 12-pillar system (Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions EFCs) (Acs et al 2017; Acs et al 2016; Acs et al 2015; Acs et al 2014). (Shown in table 10 of the appendix)

Based on the professional literature we can see that the pillars of the EFCs model generally cover what researchers were interested in regarding the critical elements of the ecosystem.

The purpose of the so-called APS (Adult Population Survey) is to poll a representative sample of the active adult population of a country (n=2000 in case of Hungary) with a standard questionnaire method. The whole database of the GEM research is really interesting, but I will refer to only a few data.

3.1.2 Results

Based on the data from the NES panels, we can see the following (Table 11 in the appendix). These data, when out of context, are up in the air unless we also examine the data of the successful ecosystems in parallel. They form three clusters based on the data from the GEM research, the least developed is the ‘Factor-based economy’, followed by ‘Efficiency-driven economy’ and at the most advanced levels, ‘Innovation-oriented economy’. I created an average (super sum, summarizing the results of countries where a well-functioning entrepreneurial
ecosystem has been functioning for decades. These countries: Canada, USA, UK, Israel, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia. To this end, I will show the ECSs results of the Hungarian NES panel, as compared to some comparative data:

The data reveal that we apparently reached worse results in those points which, according to my hypothesis, are (1) more definitive and can be listed among the soft factors. Where we significantly lag behind is Culture and norms (soft factor); governmental issues (all three branches: taxes/bureaucracy, support and importance, programs); entrepreneurial training at formal school level (soft). However, as I demonstrated earlier, the individual level is at least just as significant for the success of the enterprise. Therefore, we also need the individual level data of the GEM research (Márkus and Szerb 2014; GEM Global Report 2016-2017).

1. Table GEM research data on individual dynamics of enterprises (2014, 2015, 2016) Edited by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of business opportunity</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to launch enterprise</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>38.67</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of failure</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55.65</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial intention</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>31.45</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these figures, we can see that compared to the other countries we rank towards the lower end of the list, we are at the front only in case of ‘fear of failure’. This, however, is a reversed scale, which only confirms our backwardness, the lack of motivation in opening a sole proprietorship, or it being stuck.

2. Table GEM research data on individual dynamics of enterprises comparison (2016) Edited by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension / 2016</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Innovatio n-driven countries</th>
<th>HU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of business opportunity</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to launch enterprise</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of failure</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial intention</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the data with the average of other countries, regions or thematic groupings shows that although the difference is small, these still cause a gap of generations.

3. Table GEM research data on social image of enterprises (2014, 2015, 2016) Edited by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social standing of entrepreneurs</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>68.39</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial career</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>48.35</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media presence</td>
<td>33.47</td>
<td>33.36</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The gap in comparison to other aggregated data is more apparent in case of social image.

The ecosystem and the individual desires affect each other interactively, as I introduced in the professional literature. However, it is not attractive enough if only the infrastructure is present.

### 3.1.3 Summary of data

5. Table CBInsight and Autospy.io database summarized causes of failure (mode 1 and 2) Edited by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mode 1 (AUS)</th>
<th>Mode 2 (AUS)</th>
<th>Mode 1 (CBI)</th>
<th>Mode 2 (CBI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ph</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>ph</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 flexibility/inflexibility of ego and concentration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 conflict between founders and team issues</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 product issue</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 lack of planning and trial</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 monetary and spending issues</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 lack of social network</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the comparative table of the two databases and two methods we can see that the profiles generated from the data (and their trend lines, too) overlap, i.e. they can be regarded consistent. Items were cross-checked, as well.

6. Table CBInsight and Autospy.io database crosschecking Edited by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1-M2</th>
<th>M1-M3</th>
<th>M1-M4</th>
<th>M2-M3</th>
<th>M2-M4</th>
<th>M3-M4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>flexibility/inflexibility of ego and concentration</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict between founders and team issues</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>product issue</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of planning and trial</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monetary and spending issues</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>.618</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

if Sig>0.05, then the results achieved with the two methods are statistically similar, overlap. 
M1= mod1 AUS; M2= mod2 AUS; M3= mod1 CBI; M4= mod2 CBI.

From this analysis we can see that the main dimensions, which I supposed would affect the life of a start-up and a developing enterprise, have been confirmed. From the results of the tests run on the two databases we can deduct that although the model that was created needs further and broader checking, it has added value.

### 3.1.4 Competency research of early phase entrepreneurs

The third result of the database containing (n=36) elements in total, we found the following results with my fellow researchers (Szathmári et al under publication). In the companies, the following five factors were regarded as critical competence:

1) **Collection of information** (n=27, i.e. 72%): do they collect information in adequate quantity and quality, do they do it deliberately, is the collection of information terminated when they feel that the original concept has been proven

2) **Customer orientation** (n=23, 64%): do they find real customer need, is the phenomenon ‘in love with the solution, not the problem’ detectable. This typically came hand-in-hand with the collection of information competence, appearing in different combinations (e.g. low cust.o. and coll. of i, high cust.o. and low coll. of i)

3) **Flexibility** (n=14, 39%): whether they turn when necessary, listen to advice (coachability), change operation when necessary, or they learn from their mistakes

4) **Expertise** (n=14, 39%) - this typically included knowledge of the operation and processes of start-ups, strategic planning, financial planning, in some cases marketing-communications knowledge

5) **Analytical & critical thinking** (n=10, 28%): is the information collected properly analyzed, interpreted, are critical questions asked
These results also confirm the concept proposed in the dissertation, if the point at the fact that high level of marketing, product development, market knowledge-acquiring competencies are important. Furthermore, the findings also confirm that they not only need to be acquired, but they need to be processed with a critical view, and change if necessary. This must be a continuous, almost compulsive activity by the enterprise and its members.

4 NEW AND NOVEL SCIENTIFIC RESULTS

4.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEM

Based on the above data, as well as the summary of the professional literature, we can claim that regarding the components of the ecosystem, both the infrastructural, hard factor, and the community culture and knowledge-type elements, as soft factors seem important. While in the former there is a chance for a relatively swift development, in case of culture and competence, it takes much longer to improve deficiencies to the required level - if that is the aim. If the hard factors are not available, the individual does not even think about starting a business. In the absence of the support of the community, they do not even reach the point where they think of an entrepreneurial career as a profession. Furthermore, the possibility of failure, or the deterring power of the news from the media create counterproductive dynamics in terms of entrepreneurial intentions. These factors (culture, start-up competencies, management capacity) are those that make them give up an enterprise all too soon and not have the courage to even try the next time. It seems that in innovative communities they encourage members (children) in the early school phase through the norms and culture of the community to dare and think, and notice opportunities and try themselves. They receive mentoring help (teacher, mentor, practicing expert) in situ. An occasional failure is not a disaster but a lesson to learn from, from which they can take away something for the following opportunity. Noticing opportunities is a prerequisite and the fuel of the entrepreneurial sector.

4.2 THE ‘ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESS’

Based on the above, the most important thing in the first moment of the ‘entrepreneurial process’ is good raw material, the idea. For an idea to emerge, it is important to know the information environment and a professional skill of a field of expertise, i.e. a couple of thousand professional schemes. As a result of this, the idea is created in the mind of the mastermind/inventor/innovator, which is rather an intuitive, spontaneous process. The individual makes a decision as to what to do with this idea. If the decision is to build up an enterprise, the second entrepreneurial phase starts.

I devised the following figure based on Moore’s similar figure. (3. Ábra).

[Diagram: Psychodynamic and environmental prerequisites of the birth of an idea - decision - action. Edited by the author]
The idea comes to life, starts to become independent and to materialize, and turns into an enterprise. From this point onward, it is not the classical entrepreneurial competence that is the most needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entrepreneurial process</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaos and growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The most important player and its role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inventor/mastermind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur/producer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis/change manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
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</table>

The knowledge of a building manager and a change manager is required. The ‘dynamic capacity’ competence needs to develop. The most important knowledge of a leader is rooted in the fields of management (change management, organization building, strategic and resource planning) and marketing. So many new competencies are required in this phase that it is evident that it is not a task for one person, therefore trust in a team plays a great role here.

The next phase promises a calmer period in which a classical management function is to be performed in a consolidated organization, provided there was no fault in the earlier phases.

### 4.3 On the Competence Requirements of the Entrepreneurial Process

As the process progresses, obviously newer and newer competencies are required. More in-depth knowledge is required in several, already existing competencies. These competencies in many cases require a very different mindset from the individual. Most of the competencies we primarily connect to individuals, but these in turn need to be established in the organization as an organizational skill. In the first phase (intra) a kind of professional skill is required; and also needed are self-assurance and competitive aggression.

I termed the first phase ‘From the idea to the first step’ in which the inventor creates new things by coding the stimuli and information of the world in a specific way (Perter Thiel called this phase ‘from zero to one’ - 2015). In the next phase the entrepreneur/producer lays the foundations of the idea with their accumulated expertise, and creates something from nothing.
4.4 NARROWING DOWN THE DEFINITION OF ‘ENTREPRENEUR’

I fundamentally assume there are two kinds of schumpeterian entrepreneurs (Greathouse 2012).

1) The inventor, who has a novel, genuine idea for a product/service, or has an idea that is made up of existing components compiled in a novel way. Thus creating something new. I regard product and organizational innovation (món in nature) as part of this.

2) The innovator is able to establish an organization which produces growth in a fast-changing market by utilizing some kind of innovation to be successful. They are able to establish the environment with organizational tools in which the company is able to adapt and create innovation. I also called this actor a producer in my paper.

Those in the first category are primarily regarded as masterminds, inventors, until they attempt to bring their idea to the market by taking action. Only those of the above can be regarded as entrepreneurs who take real action on their own initiative and are not stopped by the first obstacle, at the ‘first trial’.

4.5 NON-CONVENTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (NCO)

I wish to differentiate a new organizational group with new, specific characteristics. I have already described our experiment in more articles and at more conferences (Németh 2009; 2017; Csigás and Németh 2015). With my fellow researcher, Csigás Zoltán, we have been looking for organizations since 2010 that have such a Món with which they can achieve outstanding success in the market. With regard to success, we were not merely looking for financial successes but also affecting market players by spreading the Món, as result of which the character of the market is altered: both in production and consumption, as well. I have identified a couple of dozens of companies that fulfilled our criteria.

4.6 COVA ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

The CoVa organizational model main point was developed by me. The model analyzes organizational functioning on multiple levels (Németh et al. under publishing). The spy-glass or external viewpoint; the naked eye or inner viewpoint; and the microscope, the expert’s viewpoint. This latter is embodied in a questionnaire with diagnostic purposes.

The dissertation applied the ‘naked eye viewpoint’ in this case, but at the same time I integrated in my thinking the lessons that I learnt during the model development research which can be detected in this paper in many cases, too. While establishing the organizational model, I was eager to incorporate components that I believed would actually contribute to the success of the organization.

The greatest improvement over the models that professional literature can offer is the emphasis on the phenomena of the individual-group-organization adaptation. The CoVa model is currently being tested in practice.

4.7 ADVANCEMENT OF LEWIN’S EQUATION FROM AN ENTREPRENEURS’ POINT OF VIEW

I amended the original Lewin’s equation Lewin (1972:414): \( B = f(P, E) \), where the sum of E external environmental effects, P psychic processes result in B.

I assumed that the sum of environmental effects could be described in the following way:

\[ E = (S, A, I)^b \]

where (S) is stimulus (any stimulus from the external environment that may result in a change in behavior when detected), (A) the supportive nature of culture and (I), information, which enters the perceptive
system of the individual (b). The following can be known of the exponent, as operator: if b=1 then there is no distortion, fact-based worldview is typical (reality point); if b>1, then strongly surreal desires drive behavior; 0<b<1 value means that the environmental opportunities are undervalued. We do not know what function drives the change of b, but we may assume that the character of the function of the behavior driven by loss, gains published in the prospect theory described by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) may emerge in it.

Going along this trail of thought, we attempt to define the inner psychic process elements of P in Lewin’s equation. (here is a problem that b, meaning distortion, is also a psychic process, therefore it is a question which psychic process plays a part in E and in P. Let us look at its elements along the criteria that we are already familiar with, application complemented by an equation created by Geicher and Beckhard (1969): \( R < d \times V \times F \)

For the operative modelling of Lewin’s P, I apply Geicher and Beckhard’s (i.m.) notion, the product type correlation, in a way that I use the entrepreneurial psychic operating characteristics on the level of elements, described earlier. Therefore:

\[ P = D_e = i[K \times e \times V] \]

Therefore, the psychic process \( P \), which is the entrepreneur’s decision \( (D_e) \), i.e. intention \( (i) \) i.e. the entrepreneurial intention is composed if the decision-maker has competences \( (K) \), enough energy to initiate the activity \( (e) \), created by a strong vision \( (V) \).

\( K=1 \), if they possess adequate competences, \( K \leq 0 \) if their competences are severely deficient, if they have more, if \( K>1 \). Based on the experiences, if an employee is overqualified for a certain task and performs this task on the long run, they will become bored, they will not find fulfilment, and will start looking for new opportunities. ‘e’ in case of total passivity \( e=0 \), this must somehow be put in brackets because they fall outside the scope, in other words, the interpretational range of the equation. The value of vision \( (V) \) is only \( V \geq 0 \), i.e. it does not mobilize if the value is 0, or in the vicinity, and \( V>1 \) should be greater if it is an attractive vision.

Continuing the breakdown of the above expression:

\[ K\{ek,s,ab,exp,a,pers\} \quad e\{fr,pro,coa\} \]

In case of \( K \) and \( E \), the relationship of the above factors is currently not known, therefore I dare not risk any mathematical operator, but competences \( (K) \) such as explicit knowledge \( (ek) \), skills \( (s) \), abilities \( (ab) \), experience-based implicit knowledge \( (exp) \), attitude profile \( (a) \) and personality \( (pers) \) are necessary, and energy \( (e) \) for the decision to be made in effect, which can be composed of the mixture of frustration \( (fr) \), proactivity \( (pro) \) and competitive advantage \( (coa) \). All this mixture requires a strong vision \( (V) \). We noted again that the process has specific distortions, which I marked with ‘b as operator.

\[ P = D_e = i\{K\{ek,s,ab,exp,a,pers\}\times e\{fr,pro,coa\}\times V\}^b \]

Therefore, I arrived at the next position in redesigning the earlier Lewin equation. In the expression below, in this case, \( f_e \) means the entrepreneurial function, and \( B_e \) means the started entrepreneurial behavior, i.e. the first step from the internal world to the interpersonal space, i.e. the outside world. However, knowing something in theory is only half the story. The quality of the execution is just as important and influences the later success of the ideas just as significantly. Therefore ‘exe’, as the execution factor, appears as a multiplying factor.

\[ B_e = f_e\{D_e,E\}\times exe \]

I arrived at this thought as result of a literature-review and empirical research, but the limitations of this research do not allow for the testing of this equation. Therefore, I intend to seek confirmation of this new hypothesis of mine using further resources.

4.8 KO PHENOMENA OF ORGANIZATIONS, I.E. ‘CONDITIO SINE QUA NON’

In this paper, I dealt a lot with phenomena affecting the entrepreneur and the organization, and the consequences of these effects. In the study I assumed that there are effects that boost and develop the entrepreneur and their enterprise, the result of which is progress from every aspect. This topic is built around the conceptual system of organizational excellence in management and organization sciences. Here I rather dealt with those phenomena that weaken the organizations or even lead to their downfall, therefore they can be termed fatal errors, too.
The organizations that are not able to report positive outcomes regarding the following five criteria are either dying or already dead.
1. Has no profit-making ability,
2. Has no ability to create added value,
3. Does not work as a social network,
4. Is not able to operate as an information network,
5. Does not allocate resources efficiently,

4.9 Post Mortem Research Methodology

My inspiration for the research methodology came, on the one hand, from medical activity, and also from the methodology of reverse engineering. From the point of view of methodology, in case of this research, we only receive data after the event. Based on these data, I developed my model that is suitable for forecasting. What is curious about this method is that there is no way to return to the company and collect further accurate data as the company is already defunct and the data deteriorate quickly over time (are distorted further).

5 Deductions

5.1 An Experiment of a Model

I examined the subject of enterprises using a process view. Little attention is paid in the reviewed literature to process view (McMullen and Dimov 2013), and the changes as to what the interest of the individual and the organization would be.

According to Shane and Venkataraman (2000), the process can be divided at least into discovery and realization. We consider it predetermined that the source of the idea is the entrepreneur and he/she will be the head of the company later, too. These may be distinguishable roles, but in reality, it is not divided into two or more parts (mastermind/producer/entrepreneur/innovator and manager/leader actors). As we could observe through the success of growing organizations, we can claim that the general practice is not the most optimal solution. The classical schumpeterian entrepreneur is only by chance suitable for the running of an organization. As Simon et al (2000) noted ironically, it is the entrepreneur’s own vision, distorted in a specific way, that prevents the entrepreneur later from seeing clearly and making rational decisions.

5.1.1 The experimental foundations of a new entrepreneurial model

Based on my research (both literature-based and empirical), I propose the following entrepreneurial development model.

It is evident that the entrepreneurial process must be divided differently. The phases are not separated by clear boundaries, however, typical events must occur (event based) so that we can follow the subsequent steps. Transitions require such qualitative change from the entrepreneur actor that a change of line is worth considering, i.e. the appointment of an expert with a competence pattern more suitable for the particular life cycle.

We must consider that by separating the idea and the inventor/innovator, a new era commences in the entrepreneurial process, the era of building, where more likely a change manager or sometimes a crisis/crisis intervention manager is necessary (Noszkay 2009). These four phases can only be realized successfully if handled by a suitable expert.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase name</th>
<th>Intrapyschic phase</th>
<th>Interpersonal phase</th>
<th>Small team-building</th>
<th>External funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-phase name</td>
<td>Idea sub-phase</td>
<td>Decision process</td>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td>Growing into an organization (Level 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of decision-maker/leader role</td>
<td>Inventor and entrepreneur</td>
<td>Producer/entrepreneur</td>
<td>Chaos, change and crisis manager, who, along with this, is able to build and is a convincing presenter.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical task and knowledge</td>
<td>The result of the inner working of the inventor/innovator is the idea and the decision</td>
<td>This is about the elaboration and presentation of the idea</td>
<td>Team building, creating culture, building the product</td>
<td>Presenting and selling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 ASSESSMENT AND ANSWERS TO HYPOTHESES, FURTHER RECOMMENDED RESEARCH

6.1 HYPOTHESIS 1 (ECOSYSTEM)

I defined my first hypothesis from the point of view of the success criteria of ecosystems. It was defined as follows:

**H1**: The entrepreneurial ecosystem necessitates hygienic circumstances, e.g. infrastructure, government support and programs, legal and commercial regulatory context and capital. However, what I consider most definitive is fundamentally the idea, the transformation of the idea into an enterprise, and the human resources in possession of the special competences necessary for the growth and performance of the enterprise. The quality of this human resource is what determines the success of an ecosystem. In any particular entrepreneurial life cycle, there is a need for actors with particular competences and the communities they form. These ‘soft’ factors can be called the elements of the ability to attract capital.

6.1.1 Assessment of hypothesis 1

Based on the reviewed literature and the results of the empirical research (GEM), I must conclude that my hypothesis is acceptable. The system that is built up and that operates as an ecosystem has a significant effect and influences its members. It is obviously visible that in case of more successful ecosystems the conditions were created at the level of hard factors, however, these countries manage ‘soft’ factors at a much higher level. It is not sufficient to launch governmental programs or build the physical, legal, commercial infrastructure, or flood the market with money. What is also required is the strengthening and supportive effect, i.e. cultural context, of individuals with entrepreneurial capacity and socio-social community. As I showed above, the character of the ecosystem emerges at micro levels, too, in the life of the individual, by strengthening values (at family and socio-social levels), which support or inhibit the mindset, desires, intentions and activities of the individual.

I consider it proven that along psychological, socio-psychological, sociological, economic and innovation dynamics, the ecosystem exerts a significant influence on the quality and quantity of
enterprises that launch and operate. This I find so definitive that we can claim that a particular ecosystem may have attributes with which it may make those existing inside it unviable in a particular environment or situation, or maybe successful in others. It also follows that in international comparisons not everyone can be compared to everyone else because we will not receive real results (we will make type I and type II errors). I recommend a value-based approach (culturally homogenous) in which groups can be generated, possibly leading to more valid, more reliable results.

6.2 **Hypothesis 2 (Entrepreneurial process)**

The core idea of my second hypothesis was about the rethinking of the entrepreneurial process and as a result, the most necessary competences in a particular phase. I originally formed this hypothesis: (H2) Based on my observations, I find it justifiable to separate the idea-generating phase from the entrepreneurial phase. The entrepreneurial phase is relatively short and is preceded by the idea phase and succeeded by the growth phase. The previous and successive separate phases do not require the entrepreneurial attitude (competences) of the main actor, moreover, in many cases they seem counterproductive in some situations. I suspected a lack of actual competences, e.g. the lack of establishing a value-creation process, or the foundation of a real cooperative community.

6.2.1 **Assessment of hypothesis 2**

I explored the entrepreneurial process hypothesis with literature-research and empirical (Post mortem) research, and I can conclude that in the entrepreneurial process it is worth separating the idea phase from the subsequent entrepreneurial phase and growth phase, and also from the operating phase of the consolidated company.

6.3 **Hypothesis 3 (Entrepreneurial role)**

I found confirmation in connection with entrepreneurial roles mainly through professional literature. I am only able to apply empirical data indirectly in this case. In my original hypothesis (H3), I proposed that it would be worth narrowing down the definition of an entrepreneur to an assumedly tiny community that actually possesses entrepreneurial characteristics by definition. I also attempted to define roles if they have raison d’etre based on the literature. Taking strictly the expectations of the classic authors towards the entrepreneur, it must be stated that although all of the legal formations created can be termed enterprises, however, the idea behind them, or the persons managing the idea do not satisfy the definition of entrepreneur in a schumpeterian sense. The majority of small organization owners, however, have no innovative idea or are not growth-oriented. When we assume the behavioral profile of a classic entrepreneur, the majority do not fit in this profile.

6.3.1 **Assessment of hypothesis 3**

Based on professional literature and my own observations, I identified and made the definition of entrepreneur more accurate, to determine who can be considered one. By thoroughly exploring the issue, some personality traits and states of preparedness (not actual expertise) can be identified, which may help the innovator, the inventor and the mastermind.
was able to connect some of the typical personality traits of these profiles to the entrepreneur/producer role. We were able to conclude that when the individual was lacking the competence, but it was made available on an organizational level (because of an openness to cooperation and to giving up some elements of leadership - i.e. flexibility), then even critical competences were replaceable.

I believe that the hypothesis related to the previous question (H3.1) i.e. that behind NCOs (Non-Conventional Organizations) is a ‘real’ person who better fits the definition of an entrepreneur has been proven indirectly. Although we were not looking for entrepreneurs, behind every organization there was an identifiable mastermind, or a community, who produced this novelty which manifested as a Món (as a special organizational DNA). Those who are classical entrepreneurs can be observed rather as serial entrepreneurs. Those I also categorized as entrepreneurs, but whom I preferred to call mastermind or innovator, are also the minority in the market. I also found an interesting mixed role whose main function, and therefore competence, may be to build an economic entity from the idea through some form of transformation. This entity possesses ‘Móns’ which provide it with competitive advantage, i.e. this role is rather like a process or organizational innovator, and not product. It is the producer.

6.4 Hypothesis 4 (Competence requirements and KO issues)

The professional literature, my research and my consultancy activity point in the same direction i.e. I must, at least partially, accept this hypothesis (H4) that focused on critical organizational characteristics. That I do so while at the same time noting that I was not able to identify any novelty among the individual criteria, however, in case of profiles I maintain that an intriguing outcome, even as a swift diagnostic tool, is possible.

6.4.1 Assessment of hypothesis 4

I was not able to identify any novelty whatsoever in most cases. I can conclude that one that I thought to be critical is not. This is the availability of human resources. It does not appear to be the most critical. During the research I found criteria, competences (organizational level) which are critical at a certain organizational phase and are necessary to integrate in the deep-rooted structures of an organization. These need to be built up on both sides. Both on the side of modus operandi (formal and informal processes) and modus vivendi (system of values, organizational culture, capacities, abilities). These entrepreneurial profiles (thought pattern, personality, competence) are useful later in the life of the more mature organization, as a mature organization also needs to be renewed, as we showed based on the evolutionary theories of economics. Mature organizations, however, need to acquire organization-level competencies themselves to facilitate this renewal. The two most important organization-level phenomena I identified were dynamic capacity (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) and organizational ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004 following Organizational Ambidexterity – Duncan 1976).

Out of the so-called KO (Knock Out) criteria, the first five were found to be critical, and based on them a particular organization can be studied to see whether it operates as a real enterprise and if it is viable. In terms of the sixth (human resources), I discarded its importance based on literature.

1. Has no profit-making ability,
2. Has no ability to create added value,
3. Does not work as a social network,
4. Is not able to operate as an information network,
5. Does not allocate resources efficiently,
6. Input of human resources into the organization.
7  APPENDIXES

9. Figure The Entrepreneurial process (Moore 1986:67)

7. Table Sum of Categories CB Insight TOP20 failure reason (mód 1). Created by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBInsight lista elem</th>
<th>Problem a helye</th>
<th>Jelenség</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>intra</td>
<td>ego rugalmasság/rugalmatlanság és fókuszálás</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>inter</td>
<td>alapítók közötti konfliktus és csapat probléma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>mgm</td>
<td>termék (nem old meg problémát, gyenge időzítés, piaci igények ignorálása)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>mgm</td>
<td>tervezés és próbálgatás hiánya</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>mgm</td>
<td>pénz és költelekés problémája</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>intra/inter</td>
<td>kapcsolatrendszer hiánya</td>
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8. Table Research Categories, scoring board. Created by the author

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<tr>
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összeférhetetlenség
problémák

kialakult viselkedési
problémák

gyenge döntések
komplexitás kezelés hiány
rugalmasság kezelés
rugalmas

9. Table GEM EFCs model Pillars of ecosystem. Created by the author

<table>
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<th>Vállalkozói pénzügyi lehetőségek</th>
<th>Vállalkozó képzés formalis iskolai szinten</th>
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<td>Vállalkozó képzés iskolán kívül formában</td>
<td>Belső piaci terhek és új piacra lépés</td>
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<td>K+F transzfer</td>
<td>Fizikális infrastruktúra</td>
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<td>Kormányzati Vállalkozói programok</td>
<td>Kereskedelmi és jogi infrastruktúra</td>
<td>Kultúra és társas normák</td>
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10. Table GEM EFCs Pillars of ecosystem Hungarian data 2014-2015-2016. Created by the author

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<td>Internal Market Burdens or Entry Regulation</td>
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<td>Cultural and social norms</td>
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8 PUBLICATION LIST RELATED TO THE TOPIC

1. Lectured articles

1.1. In Hungarian


1.2 In English

- Németh, G. (2017) In search of non conventional organizations. In fact, what we are looking for? Taylor Gazdálkodás- és szervezéstudományi folyóirat 9/1 (27) (ISSN 2064-4361) 15-23

2 Conference books

20
2.1 In Hungarian


2.2 In English


3. Book Chapter in English


3.1 Book Chapter In Hungarian


4. University handout: 21
Németh Gergely: A szervezeti kultúra hatása a szervezeti teljesítményre. Not Published competition article

Conference presentations

- Vállalkozók gondolkodásmodjá, személlyisége, érzelmei (ELTE PPKE nyári egyetem 2017.09.08)
- Hogyan gondolkodnak a Startupperek? (MPT Nagygyűlés 2017.06.02, Szeged)
- Szerepváltozások a vállalkozásfejlődésben (Taylor Vezut. Konf., 2017.05.26. Szeged)
- A túlszabályozottság negatív hatása a szervezetben (ReThink, 2016.11.30.Bp)
- Miben mérjük az előrehaladást és annak minőségét egy Projektben? (PM klub, 2016.09.28, BP)
- Diszkuszziós, szerekvédezt (MPT 2016.03.03. BP; TANOSZT Konf 2016.10.26
- A nem-konvencionális szervezetek nyomában, de mit is keresünk? (TaylorVezut. konf. 2016.05.27.Szeged)
- „Tudás profil” változása a felsőoktatásban (MTA Tudásmenedzsment albiz BP, 2015.04.29
- Vállalkozói kultúra fejlesztés nagyban (II. Regionális tapasztalatcserце a Dél-Alföldön. Keckemék,2014.06.12 Magos Anna-Németh G)
- Vállalkozói és befektetői kultúra – startup örölet (4. Taylor Vezetéstudományi konf. Szeged, 2014.05.30)
- Munkahelyi arcaink (XVIII. Pszinapszis, BP, 2014.04.06)
- Történeteink kulturális hasznás a szervezetekben (MTA Tudásmenedzsment albiz, Pécs, 2014.04.03)
- Tudásmenedzsment a Projektmendzsmentben (Salamon János társelőadóval, PM klub, 2014.02.20.
- IPM OCB Szervezeti diagnózis módszertana (FÖVOSZ, IPMA, BP, 2014.03.25)
- Specifikus beavatkozások és általános felkészítés sajátosságai (MPT,XXII. Orsz.Tud.Naggyűlés,BP. 2013.06.07)
- Iskolák, Módszertanok, Ekszközök és a többi... (MPT, XXIII. Orsz. Tud. Nagygyűlés, BP, 2013.06.07)
- Gazdasági díjatadházat nezéségei (torzítások) (VIKEN; 3. Taylor Vezetéstudományi konf. Szeged, 2013.05.31)
- A tanácsadó vállalkozás és projektek ezreplőinek kompetenciái (VI. Orsz.TanadKonf.BP. 2013.03.21)
- Hogyan befolyásolnak kognitív sémaiuk (sztorik)? (MTA Tudásmenedzsment albiz, Győr, 2013.03.13
- Értekezés az interdisciplinaritásról (XIX. Technika és VÁGYSZ 2010. BUDAPEST (Organization Development World Summit) Core desing team télákkal a megvalósulásig Ötlett –)
- Hogyan gondolkodnak a Startupperek? (Academy of Management Consulting Division, Amsterdam - NL,2011.09.09-11)
- Nem konvencionális vezetés (MH Föpszichológusi összevonás, Balatonlelle; 2010. Október 28.)
- Szervezként ODWS 2010. BUDAPEST (Organization Development World Summit) Core desing team tagja, a NCO-, majd az Academic munkakocspont vezetője.
- Üzleti terv készítés praktiká – Ötlettel a megvalósulásig – JVSZ – KKV hét (BP. 2010.06.07-09.)
- Intervenciós ehszközök és megközelítés – nincs új a nap alatt - vagy mégis? – MPT Munka és szervezetpszichológia szerepe Pécs, 2010.05.27.
- A társadalom kulturális hatásai a KKV vezetők gondolkodása és viselkedési mintázatára – ERONET KKV/(Győr SZE, 2010.03.26)
- Szervezeti kommunikáció könt és bent (Perlály-Papp József - Németh Gergely) Önkormányzati pr formum, (BP, BKF, 2009. november 11.)
- A munkapépiai elvárásai és igényei az akkreditált intézmények felé – AFFIOE Országos Konf. (BP. 2008.01.25)
- Egy állami nagyvállalat változáselméleti szerepek (Viken; 3. Taylor Vezetéstudományi konf. Szeged, 2013.05.31)
- Mit kell tudnia egy tanácsadónak és mit tud egy képzés adni ehhez? (SZMT, Budapest, 2011.09-14-15)
- Motiváció (Edzők felkészítése 2012 Olimpiára, SOTE TF, 2011.07.05)
- Nem konvencionális vezetés (MI Föpszichológusi összevonás, Balatonlelle; 2010. Október 28.)
- Szervezként ODWS 2010. BUDAPEST (Organization Development World Summit) Core desing team tagja, a NCO-, majd az Academic munkakocspont vezetője.
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